Getting the hard core Taliban to concede the fight without loss of face is preferable to destroying them. The latter course is rendered risky by the linkages between the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Taliban and their penetration of the Pakistani state and society.
Obama’s signal that the United States seeks to exit in 18 months will be viewed with scepticism by fence sitters in Afghanistan who will identify the victor as the one who endures.
Ideally, ISAF and NATO should concentrate on urban population centres along with the ANA, and the ANA should also deploy outside the towns and cities to dominate the hinterland and crack down on Taliban controlled areas.
The United States is facing serious economic problems, and Obama seems to have drawn the lesson that national security is not just about military strength but that it is equally about the economy, partnerships and diplomacy.
The US may have satiated its desire for vengeance but risks losing sight of its objectives due to liberal atavism, inconstancy, pusillanimity and operational ineptitude.
Post an American exit, China is likely to increase its investments in Afghanistan, provide employment to hundreds of unskilled Afghan workers, and assume the role of regional stabiliser.
On the eve of the formation of the new government it is expected that Germany would mainly devote its energy at home as the mandate is for continuity in the time of economic recession. No spectacular point-of-departure in foreign policy can hence be expected from Berlin.
America’s new strategy in Afghanistan needs to be based on the concept of `connect–hold–build’, where the ground troops surely and silently `connect’ with the local population.
Stability in Afghanistan is vital and the stakes for India are high, but the time is over for sitting on the fence. India requires a larger strategic vision, not a blueprint for town and country planning.
