China

‘Cheonan’ Epilogue: Prelude to the Sino-US Incompatibility on the South China Sea Dispute

The 'Cheonan' incident has prodded and expedited the strategic comeback of the US in East Asia. The US offer to mediate the territorial disputes over islands and seabed minerals in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 has provoked harsh criticism from the Chinese. This US diplomatic move appears to be a premeditated one to substantially diminish the influence of China in the region, to re-secure its own strategic forward military presence and to signal that it is not yet time for China to acquire absolute control over this critical waterway.

‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’: A Response to the Debate

The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.

The Time is Not Ripe for China’s Entry

Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladesh's Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujib's assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries.