Counter Insurgency

Pakistan faces a new challenge with the United States advocating privatization of security to deal with the country’s internal security challenges, a move that would also increase the level of American monitoring and supervisory capabilities.

• Shantanu Chakrabarti
• October 13, 2009
• IDSA Comments

The case of Mizoram in India provides informative lessons for conflict resolution. Factors such as addressing the root causes of the conflict, de-escalation in violence, empathizing with the conflicting actor, surrender policy for insurgents, indigenous mediators, absence of peace-spoilers, strengthening of local institutions, formation of a pan-Mizo identity and limited 'use of force' policy all played a role in establishing peace in Mizoram.

• Namrata Goswami
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Following the arrest of one of the most wanted insurgent leaders of Assam, the state government must immediately act tough against other insurgent groups operating in the hill districts of the state.

• M. Amarjeet Singh
• June 12, 2009
• IDSA Comments

At first glance, ‘Non-Lethal’ and ‘armed forces’ do not seem to go along, considering that the primary role of the military is to preserve national interests and safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of India against external threats. However, changes in the security dynamics have embroiled the Indian Army more and more in the secondary task of providing assistance to government agencies to cope with internal threats as part of ‘Aid to Civil Authority’ when requisitioned for the purpose.

• Arvind Dutta
• June 03, 2009
• IDSA Comments

The death of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam (LTTE) leader Prabhakran closes a chapter in the first counter insurgency success of the 21st century by military means. A greater challenge in nation building now faces the Sri Lankan people - integrating the Tamils in their society dominated by Sinhala Buddhists.

Purely from a military point of view some important lessons and some areas of further inquiry emerge. In brief they are:

• P. K. Gautam
• May 22, 2009
• IDSA Comments

The raging Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan underlines the limits of the use of military force. The lack of visible progress on the reconstruction activity and prevailing insecurity has alienated the Afghan populace in the remote villages of South and East Afghanistan. Given that the military option alone has limited utility in Counter-insurgency (COIN), there is a need to exercise an 'out-of-the-box' option to address the present stalemate.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• March 2009
• Strategic Analysis

More than six years after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom the Taliban and its affiliates are back, wreaking havoc on the fragile security situation and impeding development activity in Afghanistan. The Taliban-led insurgency is spreading its tentacles to new areas, with the relatively stable north swinging towards instability. This paper takes stock of the deteriorating security situation and singles out the lack of 'unity of effort' as a missing link in the international community's counter-insurgency campaign, contributing to its ineffectiveness in establishing security.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The central leadership of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is under pressure following the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by a section of its cadres. ULFA’s top leaders are likely to have a tough time ahead in keeping their outfit together. However, for the sake of peace and security of Assam, it is advisable for the Government of India to pursue the peace dialogue with a united ULFA rather than with a breakaway faction.

• M. Amarjeet Singh
• July 02, 2008
• IDSA Comments

In response to the government-organised National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee meeting held in December 2006 at Bhubaneswar, Naxalites have enunciated their counter-strategy. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), which accounts for 98 per cent of left-wing extremist violence in India, decided to intensify the people's war by increasing its mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. The decision, taken at a leadership conclave held somewhere in the forests along the Jharkand-Orissa border sometime in January or February 2007, was unanimous.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• March 06, 2007
• IDSA Comments

It has been generally accepted that the Naxal issue is more than a law and order problem. With the socio-economic dimension being increasingly important along with the military one, a question that needs to be addressed by policymakers is, how to frame a coherent framework for merging both security and development policies.

• Medha Bisht
• February 12, 2007
• IDSA Comments