Counter-Terrorism

Since 2001, Islamic terrorists have struck India with frightening frequency and ferocity. The most disturbing aspect of these attacks is that they have spread into the hinterland from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) which was the main focus of the terrorists in the late 80s and the following decade.

• Thomas Mathew
• February 25, 2009
• Policy Brief

It has been widely noted that the US has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11. This is because it undertook major reform of its homeland security structures following the 9/11 attacks. India could learn from the wide ranging CT reform in the US after 9/11 and adopt measures suitable in the Indian context.

• Arvind Gupta
• January 30, 2009
• IDSA Comments

On January 1, 2009 the National Investigative Agency Bill became a law. It provides for setting up a special agency at the national level “to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United Nations, its agencies and other international organisations and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”.

• Pushpita Das
• January 12, 2009
• IDSA Comments

Choking the flow of funds to terrorists is one of the vital aspects of combating terrorism. While its importance has been realized post 9/11 by the international community, counter measures for terrorist financing remain largely ineffective. In India, more resources and effort need to be devoted to launch a financial war against terrorists. In this context, the article attempts to establish the significance of emerging challenges in denying funds to terrorists globally and recommends a focused national response by outlining an integrated strategy.

• S. K. Saini
• January 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The staggered attacks on Mumbai across seven places were extremely demanding on time and resources required for counter operations. The attacks have also amply demonstrated that there is no scope for any lacunae in India’s security apparatus. The guard has to remain up to prevent the real ‘9/11 of India’.

• Arvind Dutta
• December 11, 2008
• IDSA Comments

For 62 hours, from the night of November 26 to the morning of November 29, the city of Mumbai was held hostage to terror attacks. A significant element in these attacks was the willingness of the terrorists to engage security forces in a frontal gun battle. Earlier attacks have generally involved simultaneous bomb blasts in crowded market places, hospitals and office complexes. The intensity and meticulous planning that went into the attacks are of an unprecedented nature.

• Namrata Goswami
• December 05, 2008
• IDSA Comments

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai which left more than 170 people killed and close to 300 injured did not conform to the pattern to which Indian security agencies have got accustomed to over a period of time. Except for the suicide attack on the CRPF Group Centre, Rampur (UP) at the beginning of 2008, terrorists had generally resorted to detonating improvised explosive devices in crowded places to cause maximum casualties.

• Satinder K. Saini
• December 03, 2008
• IDSA Comments

Following the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland, India and Pakistan emerged as important states in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The gathering momentum in the Indo-US relations during the Clinton Presidency underwent a dramatic transformation. Although increased cooperation in defence issues is understood to have 'led' the India-US relationship to its current level, it has not culminated in enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation. This perceived lack of cooperation can be located within the perceptual differences on key security issues.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The low-intensity bombs that blew up in Ahmedabad and Bangalore have thrown light on the challenges before India’s intelligence agencies. Not only are the agencies unsure of who is behind the attack, the terrorists remain faceless. The obvious question to ask is: why has there been a spate of low-intensity bombings in small markets as opposed to say, the high-intensity bombing of a strategic location?

• Prakarsh Singh
• August 07, 2008
• IDSA Comments

In many ways the story of Punjab is anomalous to the stylized facts of civil war literature. Empirical literature on civil wars points to a negative correlation between income and likelihood of conflict. There is also cross-country evidence to suggest that rough terrain contributes to greater possibility of violence. Both these facts did not hold in the case of Punjab. However, recent research on terrorism supports the view that terrorism is not correlated with poverty and lower education levels.

• Prakarsh Singh
• July 18, 2008
• IDSA Comments