If India is indeed interested in being a ‘rule-maker’ in a multilateral world, alternative approaches to persisting problems is the basic component of it.
Since safeguarding the public space such as mass transportation networks, financial and industrial hubs from sporadic acts of terror is increasingly becoming difficult, socialising citizenry in democratic societies to the needs of counterterrorism assumes salience.
Unlike ‘hard’ measures, ‘soft’ ones can succeed in softening the hearts and minds of even hard-core terrorists, especially when they are disillusioned, longing for a normal life, and want to exit from terrorism.
There is a need to modify existing laws and if need be create new ones so that extremists and terrorists do not go scot-free and continue to pose a threat to the country.
Since both India and EU face the same threat of religious radicalism at home and from across the border, focused cooperation on this issue must be given serious thought.
Instead of beefing up army/police/paramilitary forces in the towns and cities, the government needs to urgently take measures to prevent entry of the criminal and terrorist elements at or close to the border.
It is true that any negotiation with the outfit in the absence of Paresh Barua is going to meet only with partial success, but if the government manages to mainstream Arabinda Rajkhowa, the support base of ULFA would further erode.
Apart from the reluctance to move beyond viewing the India-US relationship through the prism of US-China or even US-Pakistan ties, the Indian political leadership and the strategic community have so far failed to define India’s role in the growing partnership with the United States.
While countries need to adopt each other’s best practices to deal with the hydra-headed monster called terrorism, there cannot be a magic bullet or a single successful counter-terror strategy.
Why are the two largest democracies – India and the United States – starkly different when it comes to tackling terrorism? The answer to this perplexing question could lie in the two countries' divergent approach to security and management of national security resources. Equally relevant is the variance in their political resoluteness in exercising suitable responses to emergent threats.
