Defence Cooperation

The Modi’s government determination to adopt a muscular stance on national security and its commitment to expedite defence modernisation are likely to translate into greater political and defence engagement with Israel.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• February 19, 2015
• IDSA Comments

It is difficult to visualise how the Russian offer to make LUH in India could be actualised unless the government invokes ‘strategic considerations’ for making it in India or signs an inter-governmental agreement for that purpose.

• Amit Cowshish
• December 15, 2014
• IDSA Comments

There now seems to be greater recognition of India’s concerns on transfer of technology and not just about co-production but also co-development of next generation weapons. The larger objective for India, however, must be to reduce its dependence on import of foreign equipment and modernize its armed forces in the quickest possible timeframe.

• Amit Cowshish
• August 13, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The long expected Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) was signed between the governments of India and China on 23 October 2013 in Beijing, during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to the People’s Republic of China. The draft of the agreement had been through close-door negotiations by both the governments for about a year prior to its signing. Incidentally, it was also during these negotiations that a three week long face-to-face incident occurred—in April-May 2013—at Depsang located in the Aksai Chin region which is disputed between India and China.

• Bijoy Das
• January 2014
• Journal of Defence Studies

The objective of this article is to discuss defence cooperation between Malaysia and India in the post-Cold War era (1991–2012), mainly from Malaysia’s perspective. The article is divided into four parts. First, the historical background of Malaysia–India defence cooperation during the colonial period until the Cold War is discussed briefly. Second, defence cooperation in the post-Cold War period involving the three services (air force, navy and army) is examined. Third, certain issues in Malaysia–India defence cooperation are analysed.

• Suseela Devi Chandran
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

India-US defence ties are shifting away from a ‘buyer-seller’ path to one of co- development and co-production. In Washington this is viewed as a change from a ‘culture of presumptive no to one of presumptive yes’.

• Vivek Kapur
• October 15, 2013
• IDSA Comments

While India has supplied arms and equipment quite selectively to Myanmar, the outcome, which was expected to serve India’s interests, has not been commensurate.

• Gautam Sen
• January 15, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The United Kingdom (UK) is keen on establishing a ‘stronger, wider and deeper’ relationship with India. It is ‘determined to make’ defence cooperation ‘an essential part’ of this relationship. London sees such a relationship with an India that will shape the twenty-first century as ‘an essential pillar’ in its ‘broader strategy’ to fashion a role for itself in Asia.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• January 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

This commentary looks at the characteristics of Saab’s recent investments as well as the prospect and challenges for current and future Swedish-Indian collaboration in the defence industrial sector.

• Rebecka S. Rydberg
• September 28, 2012
• IDSA Comments

This article analyses US-India strategic relations and the potential role of defence trade. First, it argues that cooperative relations between the two countries are hindered by “competing exceptionalisms” and the lack of a pre-existing model for the relationship. At the same time, bilateral relations are being strengthened by a convergence of interests and increasing societal linkages. Even on issues that have historically divided New Delhi and Washington-such as relations with third countries-there is a more nuanced understanding of differing perspectives in both capitals.

• Anit Mukherjee , Manohar Thyagraj
• April 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies