Defence Doctrine

The aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the development of India's Limited War Doctrine. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application. This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.

• Ali Ahmed
• 2012
• Monograph

Struggling to deal with a rigid China on the intractable border issue, India would do well to digest the core assertions of the white paper, including the growing reach of the PLA, its professionalisation, keenness to protect overseas interests, modernisation of the nuclear arsenal, and growing role in foreign policy making.

• Arvind Gupta
• April 25, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

• Frank O’Donnell
• February 10, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The commentary makes the case for reopening the Limited War debate in order to inform explicit articulation of a Limited War doctrine.

• Ali Ahmed
• February 29, 2012
• IDSA Comments

During the entire post-World War II period Japan isolated itself from the ongoing power struggle. Even during the height of the Cold War when its two neighbours – the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China – went nuclear, Japan followed the three principles of ‘not possessing’, ‘not introducing’ and ‘not manufacturing’ nuclear weapons. Successive Japanese parliaments also passed resolutions putting a one per cent GDP cap on defence spending and imposed a blanket ban on arms exports and arms-related technologies.

• Shamshad A. Khan
• May 2011
• Strategic Analysis

Workable options short of war, as ‘Cold Start Minor’ suggests, would serve as deterrent to informed by the logic of leaving something to chance.

• Ali Ahmed
• December 13, 2010
• IDSA Comments

As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region.

• Sushant Sareen
• November 22, 2010
• IDSA Comments

Non-articulation of India's strategic doctrine lends it to be interpreted and perceived variously. India's security establishment need not be defensive about its strategic doctrine but boldly take on critics in the strategic community. Besides, its articulation would help provide direction to the military in their formulation of military doctrine, planning and acquisitions.

• Ali Ahmed
• October 25, 2010
• IDSA Comments

The Cold Start doctrine is an innovative exercise. While Cold Start discusses how to start the campaign, equal thinking needs to attend how to end it. On the conventional level, the learning is that the Cold Start offensives of the integrated battle groups need to be delinked from those of the strike corps. Plausible political aims cannot be visualised that make nuclear risk of launch of strike corps offensives worth running. On the nuclear front, fallout of the scenario considered is on the doctrine of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation.

• Ali Ahmed
• October 2010
• Journal of Defence Studies

The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand.

• Ali Ahmed
• September 28, 2010
• IDSA Comments