India-Sri Lanka Relations

Despite its abstention, India will continue to be evaluated negatively in Sri Lanka for its approach to the Tamil issue. Moreover, Colombo is also taking steps which may unnecessarily complicate bilateral relations.

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• April 16, 2014
• IDSA Comments

It would appear that India accorded preponderance to the broader interests of national sovereignty before its final stand on the UNHRC resolution. But it also cannot be oblivious to the likelihood of parallels being drawn in the future by some countries inimical to India.

• Gautam Sen
• April 04, 2014
• IDSA Comments

India must vote against Sri Lanka in the UNHRC in order to force the latter to set up its own enquiry commission on war crimes, implement the recommendations of the LLRC pertaining to the rights of Tamils, and evolve its own ‘home grown’ solution to the ethnic issue.

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• March 20, 2013
• IDSA Comments

It will be in keeping with the normative principles of India’s foreign policy to support a resolution that does not undermine Sri Lanka’s sovereignty but stipulates a time-bound and monitorable implementation by the SLG as well as UNHRC of remedial measures in accordance with the LLRC recommendations.

• Gautam Sen
• March 12, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Mahinda Rajapaksa has emerged as perhaps the only Sri Lankan leader who has managed to secure some strategic autonomy in conducting his country's foreign policy vis-à-vis India. He engaged India effectively during the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and simultaneously countervailed India by improving his country's relationship with India's traditional adversaries such as China and Pakistan. In the post-LTTE scenario, he has maintained a defiant posture vis-à-vis India over the latter's persuasion to evolve a political solution to the ethnic issue.

• Ashok K. Behuria , Gulbin Sultana
• January 2013
• Strategic Analysis

The ‘ethnic question’ in Sri Lanka, even after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), evokes a sense of suspense, uncertainty and even a possible conflict of interest in the otherwise robust and multifaceted relationship between India and Sri Lanka. The article adopts a multi-agent model derived from the positional analysis and identifies three principal agents in Indo-Sri Lanka relations—the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), the Government of India (GoI) and Tamil Nadu.

• Amali Wedagedara
• January 2013
• Strategic Analysis

India-Sri Lanka relations appear to be reaching a phase of stagnation. The Govt of India has to adopt, perforce, a multifaceted approach on the cultural, economic and security fronts for stability of the bilateral relations in the overall interest of India.

• Gautam Sen
• September 13, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The much-talked about Tamil Nadu factor in India-Sri Lanka relations has come to the fore recently again in the wake of strong reactions of the provincial government to the training of two Sri Lankan defence personnel in the state in August 2012

• Gulbin Sultana
• September 12, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The much-talked about Tamil Nadu factor in India-Sri Lanka relations has come to the fore recently again in the wake of strong reactions of the provincial government to the training of two Sri Lankan defence personnel in the state in August 2012

• Gulbin Sultana
• September 12, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka throws up five major lessons for future regional stability operations. Firstly, it is imperative to define the mission unambiguously and establish a clear mandate. Secondly, there is need for a robust military contingency planning process as well as discussions at various levels within the system to refine plans and provide an adequate force to meet possible eventualities. Thirdly, clear command and control needs to be established at the outset and the appropriate field formation must be designated as the headquarters.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• July 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies