State governments have to be coaxed and cajoled into actively participating and cooperating with the Centre in the national endeavour to secure India’s coasts.
The issue of water allocation and water rights of Bangladesh, India and China could form the basis of a framework on which joint cooperation among the three countries can be formulated.
The orientation of the existing administrative set up in Service Headquarters and in departments under the Ministry of Defence is to plan for the utilization of defence budget allocation. They are not in a position to pay attention to the aspect of defence receipts.
Why are the two largest democracies – India and the United States – starkly different when it comes to tackling terrorism? The answer to this perplexing question could lie in the two countries' divergent approach to security and management of national security resources. Equally relevant is the variance in their political resoluteness in exercising suitable responses to emergent threats.
A critical appraisal of the national security decision making (NSDM) during IPKF operations is revealing. At every stage, the NSDM was found wanting. The fact that none of the actors possessed the delicate skill or means by which to control events proved that not much thought had gone into the decisions. Involvement of numerous actors made the decision making challenging, which was further complicated by varied and cacophonous inputs and assessments. Overconfidence also created an opaque in the clarity of decisions taken. Lessons from the IPKF involvement are numerous.
The August 2009 bilateral pact will fortify the security of the Maldives as well as cater to Indian security concerns on the terrorism and geopolitical fronts.
The aggressive posture that the Chinese have adopted along the otherwise relatively tranquil Line of Actual Control (LOAC) has come under a lot of analytical examination by Indian Sinologists. They have advanced a number of explanations for the Chinese actions, all of which have a ring of truth about them.
The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.
In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.
