India

The July 7 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul which left 58 people dead including four Indians and more than 140 wounded was a highly provocative act. Those responsible for the attack are well known, and their objectives are also not a matter of speculation. It is understood that the Indian government should be taking far more stringent security measures to minimise the recurrence of such attacks on its embassy, consulates, and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.

• Vishal Chandra
• July 18, 2008
• IDSA Comments

Now that the IAEA Draft Agreement is on the World Wide Web and the Communists have withdrawn their support to the UPA, it is reasonable to assume that the next few steps will also follow in good time. The alacrity with which the Americans have drafted their letter to the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is remarkable and shows that the Bush administration is indeed very keen to see the deal through before its term ends at the end of the year. What we are not so sure of, however, is the future of the UPA and the Congress.

• Ramesh Phadke
• July 17, 2008
• IDSA Comments

The July 7 gruesome attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which resulted in the loss of over 40 lives including those of two senior diplomats, is clearly a high value symbolic attack directed at coercing India into scaling down its growing presence in rebuilding war ravaged Afghanistan. It is a clear reminder, following as it does a series of low and small scale attacks on Indians in previous months and years, that the Indian presence is continuing to hamper the interests of Pakistan which is bent upon regaining its lost ‘strategic depth’ in that country.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• July 09, 2008
• IDSA Comments

On the face of it, India and NATO are poles apart. NATO is a military alliance. India is a non-aligned country with an independent foreign policy. Any engagement between India and NATO is, therefore, problematic.

• Arvind Gupta
• July 08, 2008
• IDSA Comments

The PLA Navy (PLAN)'s capabilities in key areas (assets, trained personnel, experience) are currently insufficient to support long-range sea lanes of communication (SLOC) defense missions. With sufficient effort, Beijing may eventually overcome these obstacles, but it would probably also have to acquire some form of overseas basing access, which its foreign policy still proscribes.

• Andrew S. Erickson
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Dawa Norbu
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

With elections looming large in both countries and the Indo-US nuclear deal facing its moment of truth, the inevitable question will arise as to who has gained how much from the Strategic Partnership that was signed with great fanfare in July 2005. This is not withstanding the fact that the failure of the nuclear deal would undoubtedly be a setback for both countries and besmirch the reputations of those leaders who had put their personal prestige on the line. It would also reflect poorly on the political parties and the governments involved in various ways.

• Cherian Samuel
• June 16, 2008
• IDSA Comments

The review of the composite bilateral dialogue process by the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on May 22 at Islamabad was significant in many ways. This was the first ever review, that too during the course of the first ever high level visit by an Indian minister after the new government took power in Pakistan. Both countries have accepted a gradual process of resolving the outstanding issues between them. Pakistan has said that it is important to raise awareness among the people about their stake in the peace process.

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• May 30, 2008
• IDSA Comments

Ever since the new democratically elected government assumed office in Pakistan, analysts have drawn up exhaustive priority lists of tasks before it. These range from restoring civilian pre-eminence over the military, countering terrorism, building democratic institutions, freedom of the media, and restoration of the judiciary. The new government, however, will do well to also order a review of the use of covert action as an instrument of state policy, which has been a major factor for the ills that afflict Pakistan and undermines its credibility in the international community.

• Satinder K. Saini
• May 28, 2008
• IDSA Comments

“[China] feels that the Himalayas alone in this nuclear age are not enough to guarantee its national security, especially in view of Tibet’s strategic location. [It], therefore, ideally wants a China of small, preferably pro-Chinese, neighbours on the cis-Himalayan region separating the two Asian giants.”

- Dawa Norbu

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• May 23, 2008
• IDSA Comments