Indian Ocean Region

The Protection of Sea Lines of Communication during 1971 War

As the bulk of India’s foreign trade transits through sea, it turns sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean strategically important for India. The newly independent India did not pay adequate attention to this factor. Consequently, within two decades of independence continuous flow of unprotected large volume of India’s sea trade had become a strategic target for its adversaries. In this context, during the 1971 India–Pakistan war, India efficiently protected its vital sea lanes, ensuring that goods and commodities continued to reach Indian ports.

Planning and Impact of Special Operations during the 1971 Indo-Pak War

India had all of two weeks to achieve the politico-military end state of liberating Bangladesh, before the international community intervened to impose a ceasefire. Speed and tempo of operations were imperative.Indian Armed Forces exploited the special operations capabilities to ensure an early fall of Dhaka. The airborne assault at Tangail, the audacious helilift of troops across the mighty Meghna by General Sagat Singh with effective support from the Mukti Bahini contributed to the early fall of Dhaka with most defences still intact.

The Sino-Indian Geopolitics and Maritime Security of the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a prominent arena in international politics, in terms of trade, tourism, population, among other aspects. Several countries, some unconnected geographically, have shown interest in these waters. These entities offer financial, technical, infrastructural and capacity-building support, and security services to several IOR countries. India, the prominent resident power of this ocean, and others, consider this development unnecessary, uncalled for and unacceptable.

Indian Ocean Perspectives: From Sea Power to Ocean Prosperity

Long before the Atlantic and the Pacific became theatres for commerce and conflict, the Indian Ocean was home to considerable commercial and cultural intercourse. Most recent literature has, however, focused on maritime security and sea power while greater attention ought to be paid to economic development around the Indian Ocean. India’s plans for the development of the ‘Blue Economy’ augurs well for the region.

Geopolitics of Western Indian Ocean: Unravelling China’s Multi-dimensional Presence

The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is now attaining centrestage in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. Apart from France and the US, China holds significant interests in the WIO. China’s interests with the WIO states could be divided in four categories: dual-use infrastructure building, politico-diplomatic focus, connectivity-access and military activities. All four are interconnected and facilitate China’s desire to project power. For China, activities in the WIO serve the purpose of ensuring energy supplies, maintaining economic growth and securing military interests.

India’s Domestic Debate over China’s Growing Strategic Presence in the Indian Ocean

This article seeks to capture the domestic debate in India over China’s activities in the Indian Ocean. It engages the critical geopolitical articulation around formal, practical and popular geopolitics, and provides a narrow perspective on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It begins with a look at how India and China perceive the IOR, which is crucial to understand how the Indian Ocean is framed in the public consciousness in India.

Indian Diaspora in Reunion Island: A Strategic Asset

Wherever Indians have migrated, they have carried with them their culture, which has subsequently served to build multi-layered bridges with their country of origin. The article studies the Indian migration to the French territory of Reunion Islands located in the southwestern Indian Ocean and delves into various factors, including the historical, demographic, socio-economic aspects of the evolution of the Indian diaspora.

China’s Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand Strategy?

The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative.