Going Beyond the Public Statement on Iranian Oil
Having rejected the western demand for oil sanctions, the real test for the Indian government lies in whether it can implement its public pronouncement.
- P. R. Kumaraswamy
- February 09, 2012
Having rejected the western demand for oil sanctions, the real test for the Indian government lies in whether it can implement its public pronouncement.
There has been an increasing assertion of the velayat-e-faqih in Iranian politics in recent years. This has led to tensions between them and the presidential office in Iran. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to analyse the constitutional position of the velayat-e-faqih and how it has interacted with other institutions to shape Iranian foreign policy. The article critically analyses the relationship between the velayat-e-faqih and different popularly elected presidents.
The Arab countries where people have successfully overthrown the dictatorial regimes now face the daunting task of moving forward with democratic processes, economic development and institution building.
Despite reports of deliberations of war in anticipation of and later publication of the latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, the November 18 IAEA resolution has desisted from referring the issue to the UNSC. New set of unilateral sanctions on its oil sector by US, Britain, and Canada announced on November 21 though have further increased the economic stakes for Iran.
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is widely misunderstood. On the one hand many experts regard the Iranian foreign policy as being essentially ideology driven while on the other hand a significant body of opinion believes that ideology is a convenient smokescreen for Iran's pursuit of its national interests. This paper examines the role of ideological, political and institutional actors in the context of the Islamic Republic's quest for consensus and cohesion.
If peace is to prevail in East Asia, Pyongyang must abandon its uranium enrichment programme and all aspects of its nuclear programme should be placed under international monitoring.
The role of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has come under an increasing spotlight in recent years. This scrutiny has intensified in the wake of the controversial June 2009 presidential elections and the unrest which followed. Western governments, in tandem with the more radical sections of the Iranian opposition, appear keen to construct a narrative wherein the IRGC steadily displaces the ruling clergy as Iran's political masters. Fears of a growing political role for the IRGC – let alone a full-blown military takeover – are overstated.
Rafsanjani losing the position of chairman of the Assembly of Experts is a gain for Ahmadinejad and the hardliners.
Continuing conflict, competition and rivalry have been a regular phenomenon in the Gulf region over the past few decades. Among other reasons, the troubled relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Iran has been one of the major factors responsible for the present state of affairs in the region. The relationship has been marked by sectarian and ideological differences, clash of interests over the presence of the US in the region, concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme and territorial disputes between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Mubarak’s fall may bring Iran closer to Egypt than ever before. Iran has taken a pro-people stand and hopes to reap a harvest of good-will in the Arab world. The Iranian Opposition has also extended support to the movement, though for different reasons.