Mumbai attack

New Challenges of Cyberwar: Stocktaking from Mumbai Experience

The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks have highlighted the new challenges posed by cyberwar. A faked telephone call from the India Foreign Minister to the Pakistani President caused a diplomatic flutter. It appears that the new civilian leadership in Pakistan was not aware of diplomatic protocol involved in such telephonic contacts and was fooled into believing that this was indeed a genuine communication.

Imperative of Exercising Control over the ISI

The deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai is set to derail India-Pakistan bilateral relations. With all the evidence pointing towards Pakistan, it has become difficult to advocate that India must go ahead with the composite dialogue. The Indian government is understandably frustrated with Pakistan’s reluctance and/or inability to act against radical groups within its territory. In spite of repeated Pakistani assurances, radical groups are still operating openly in Pakistan, raising funds for jihad, and imparting armed training to jihadists.

Lessons from the 9/11 Commission

The unprecedented scale of the terror attacks in Mumbai and the fact that citizens from more than 20-plus countries were killed or injured in the attacks have evoked an international response. This response has been a mixture of sympathy and concern along with muted criticism of what is perceived to be the ham-handed handling of the crisis as well as the inability to take preventive measures. It was reiterated by the visiting US Secretary of State that the Mumbai attacks could have been prevented and cited the example of the United States successfully preventing all attacks after 9/11.

Mumbai Attacks: A Deadly “Performance”

For 62 hours, from the night of November 26 to the morning of November 29, the city of Mumbai was held hostage to terror attacks. A significant element in these attacks was the willingness of the terrorists to engage security forces in a frontal gun battle. Earlier attacks have generally involved simultaneous bomb blasts in crowded market places, hospitals and office complexes. The intensity and meticulous planning that went into the attacks are of an unprecedented nature.

Fishing in Troubled Waters

Investigations into the Mumbai attacks have revealed that the terrorists came in from the sea. It has been reported that in the course of their journey from Karachi they had hijacked an Indian trawler named Kuber with a Porbandar registration in the high seas off the Coast of Gujarat. The trawler, fitted with the latest communication and navigation equipment including a Global Positioning system (GPS), Very High Radio Frequency (VHF) sets, etc., was found abandoned nearly four nautical miles off Cuffe Parade in south Mumbai.

The Pakistan Link to the Mumbai Terror Attacks

Investigations into the attacks in Mumbai and subsequent developments point to the role of the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as the key player that orchestrated the well coordinated attacks. The lone arrested terrorist is a Pakistani national and he has provided minute details of the events leading up to the attacks. Indian claims about elements within Pakistan being responsible for the attack have also been endorsed by the United States.

The Need to Refine India’s Response to Terrorist Incidents

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai which left more than 170 people killed and close to 300 injured did not conform to the pattern to which Indian security agencies have got accustomed to over a period of time. Except for the suicide attack on the CRPF Group Centre, Rampur (UP) at the beginning of 2008, terrorists had generally resorted to detonating improvised explosive devices in crowded places to cause maximum casualties.

The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament

Evidence gathered in the aftermath of by far the most deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai indicates conclusively that the attack was planned by the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba. The attack on Mumbai was executed by a well trained and indoctrinated suicide squad comprising of ten Pakistani terrorists. This testifies to the long gestation planning and preparation that can only have been made possible by the resources of a well established terrorist organization. The recruitment was from Punjab, training was in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and maritime training was conducted in Karachi.