Nuclear Doctrine

“Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

• Satish Chandra
• April 30, 2014
• Issue Brief

The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

• Frank O’Donnell
• February 10, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.

• Ali Ahmed
• May 12, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Fears by some analysts that India has recently altered its nuclear doctrine, and particularly its no first use policy, are unfounded.

• Vipin Narang
• March 01, 2011
• IDSA Comments

The robustness of India's nuclear doctrine would face a severe challenge in the case of conventional military offensives into Pakistan in a future Indo-Pak conflict. Such offensives are possible in case Pakistan's nuclear threshold is taken as high and its doctrine one of 'last resort'. However, Pakistani nuclear use options may include lower order nuclear use. In light of this, it recommends that India take a serious look at the Limited War concept as well as revise its nuclear doctrine to 'flexible nuclear retaliation'.

• Ali Ahmed
• July 2010
• Strategic Analysis

The US Nuclear Posture Review The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)1 is a policy document of the US Department of Defense that underlines the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s… Continue reading De-linking CBW from Nuclear Deterrence

• P K Sundaram
• April-June 2010
• CBW Magazine

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

• Ali Ahmed
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

In a new book Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards a Credible Deterrent, Dr. Manpreet Sethi has recommended a restructuring of India’s Nuclear Command Authority. Since India’s nuclear doctrine is premised on ‘Assured Retaliation’, nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Presently, the Nuclear Command Authority, as approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 04 January 2003, stipulates:

• Ali Ahmed
• September 09, 2009
• IDSA Comments

There has been a shift to a deterrent strategic doctrine with an offensive bias. India's strategic doctrine is thus potentially a compellent one. However, cognizance of the need for limitation to conflict in the nuclear age entails identification of the implications of compellence for both conventional and nuclear doctrines. On the conventional plane, the hiatus between pivot corps and strike corps offensives is taken as a key 'exit point' for war termination efforts.

• Ali Ahmed
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

• Rahul Roy Chaudhury
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis