Nuclear

The US Nuclear Posture Review The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)1 is a policy document of the US Department of Defense that underlines the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s… Continue reading De-linking CBW from Nuclear Deterrence

• P K Sundaram
• April-June 2010
• CBW Magazine

India and the United Kingdom, as nuclear weapons states, have much to gain from, and much to contribute to, a strengthened regime for nuclear and radiological security.

• Rajiv Nayan , Ch. Viyyanna Sastry , Wyn Q. Bowen , Ben Rhode
• April 12, 2010
• Policy Brief

With the possibility of ‘smart’ sanctions in the near future and muscular US military moves in the Persian Gulf, the grids for the end game on Iran’s nuclear intransigence are getting strengthened.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• April 07, 2010
• IDSA Comments

In a fundamental shift in its position on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, Pakistan has made it known that it will join the NPT only as a recognised nuclear weapons state.

• Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• March 08, 2010
• IDSA Comments

• Reshmi Kazi
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

• Ali Ahmed
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

• Vikram Sarabhai
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

The Joint Statement catapulted India-Japan strategic and global partnership to a “New Stage” in which the bilateral relationship is going to be deepened on all fronts, embracing regional, global and economic issues.

• Rajaram Panda
• January 07, 2010
• IDSA Comments

The draft deal is envisaged as a test of Iran’s intentions, and from the Iranian point of view as a test of Western countries’ assurance to facilitate its peaceful nuclear programme.

• M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi
• November 05, 2009
• IDSA Comments

In order to construct an operational nuclear device, terrorists need to obtain the requisite fissile materials - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) or plutonium. It has been proved that, generally, it is much simpler to devise a crude nuclear bomb with HEU than with plutonium. Hence, terrorists can have 'reasonable confidence' in the performance of weapons-grade HEU bombs. The magnitude of the threat of nuclear terrorism from Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear weapons programme is assuming alarming proportions. However, adequate preventive steps can be taken to minimize the danger.

• Reshmi Kazi
• November 2009
• Strategic Analysis