Nuclear

The Board of Governors of IAEA is scheduled to meet on March 6, 2006 to decide the next step after the passage of the February 2006 resolution against Iran. The crisis is deepening fast. The controversies related to Iran's past procurements and associated deeds seem to be far from coming to a close soon.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• March 03, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Russia's concern over Iran's nuclear programme is increasing with every passing day. Iranian authorities are showing un-willingness to accept Russia's proposal to enrich uranium in Russian territory. Russia is trying to resolve an international crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons programme, though its position on Iran has rhetorically moved closer to the European "Troika" (France, Germany, UK). Russia agreed to Iran's referral to the UN Security Council on the condition that the council would take action only after the March 6 IAEA meeting.

• Nivedita Das Kundu
• February 10, 2006
• IDSA Comments

When the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States signed a joint Statement on July 18 last year, which included, inter alia, a move towards lifting the three decades old regime of technology denials on India and an implicit recognition of India's nuclear weapons programme, negative reactions were expected: disbelief and distrust in India, and outrage from the non-proliferation lobby in the US, still deeply convinced of the need, even after thirty years, to "cap, roll back and eliminate" India's nuclear weapons ambitions.

• Arundhati Ghose
• January 06, 2006
• IDSA Comments

One of the major objectives of the United States in entering into the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement is to bring about an early freezing of the Indian weapon-usable nuclear materials stock at the minimum possible level. India, in turn, obviously wants to retain all the accumulated inventory of such materials, as well as the facilities to produce the additional material we consider essential for a minimum deterrence, out of IAEA safeguards. Obviously, each country wants to manoeuvre the separation plan to suit its specific objective.

• A. Gopalakrishnan
• January 05, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Two rounds of negotiations have been held between Indian and US officials to negotiate implementing the Indo-US nuclear agreement, embedded in the Joint Statement issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush on July 18, 2005. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's talks with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas D Burns in Washington last week was the second round.

• P. R. Chari
• January 05, 2006
• IDSA Comments

Unable to restrain Iran from continuing with its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has turned to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for help. The IAEA, a specialised agency under the United Nations, by deciding to send to the UNSC its March 2006 report on the status of Iran’s implementation record on IAEA safeguards on its nuclear installations has indicated that the situation is serious enough to be taken up by the higher UN body responsible for international security.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• January 2006
• Strategic Analysis

Much of the current debate on India’s decision to evolve a set of agreements with the United States and engage the international nuclear technology control regimes in order to promote civilian nuclear cooperation unfortunately has not focused on some of the key questions involved and the available options before the country. Clearly, the country needs to take decisions from a subset of options that are i) politically feasible and ii) most desirable/least undesirable from the viewpoint of national interests.

• G. Balachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The 18 July Bush-Manmohan Agreement is currently being implemented, in bits and pieces. At the time of the signing of the agreement it was stated by different officials that both governments would proceed to unilaterally implement the provisions that pertained to them and there would be no expectations of reciprocity.

• Raja Menon
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?

• Rajiv Nayan
• August 04, 2005
• IDSA Comments

The joint statement issued at the Manmohan Singh-Bush summit held in Washington (July 18) has generated considerable interest and anxiety in both countries for the manner in which it has addressed the nuclear issue. It merits recall that the nuclear determinant has bedeviled the bi-lateral relationship between the US and India for well over three decades since India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 – which was further exacerbated after the May 1998 Shakti nuclear tests that gave India a de facto nuclear weapon status.

• C Uday Bhaskar
• July 25, 2005
• IDSA Comments