I welcome this opportunity to present to such a distinguished audience some views on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and international security. At the outset, I would like to thank the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) for inviting me to deliver this address. The Institute has a well deserved reputation as our premier strategic think tank and quite appropriately, they have focused on a subject that not only has a strong contemporary relevance but represents a long term challenge for India and the international community.
In a significant turn of events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24, 2005, adopted a resolution (22-1 with 12 countries abstaining) calling upon Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency in terms of revealing its ‘secret’ nuclear programme failing which the issue will be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 Althoug
The agenda of the NPT Rev Con, currently underway in New York, has now been finalized. Moreover, the Chairman of the Rev Con, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil has also been able to finalize upon the three Main Committees (MC) and the three Subsidiary Bodies (SB). These three subsidiary bodies will look into three important issues: practical steps towards disarmament (SB1), regional issues including the issue of Middle East (SB2) and the issue of withdrawal from the NPT (SB3).
The immediate challenge ahead for the state parties to the NPT in the ongoing Review Conference, May 2-27, 2005 in New York, is how to salvage the tarnished image of the treaty. The efficacy of the treaty is under scrutiny primarily on three issues— disarmament, nonproliferation, and universality of compliance. The unraveling facts of over the last two years, related to various kinds of breaches of the NPT commitments by Libya, Iran and North Korea, add to further suspicion over the credibility of the treaty.
The paper examines the salient features of the principal statutory authority, the Export Administration Act (EAA), that is, at present, governing dual-use technology control in the US, and the frontiers of dual-use export control after the enactment of the new Act. An analysis of different provisions of the bills for the new Act indicates mixed features. It does not completely liberalise the control of dual-use technology, and continues to have in place a number of curbs.
The new US Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, made her first halt in New Delhi on March 16, 2005 during her whistle-stop tour of Asia that took her across the continent to Japan and China, among other countries. The symbolism of identifying Delhi as her first destination reiterates the determination of the Bush team to consolidate the relationship with India and realise the potential hinted at during the first term, and this was emphasised by Rice during her visit.
In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.
Against all odds, Iran is pressing hard to prove its nuclear innocence and keeping its promises under the provisions of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is refusing to go along with Iran’s denials on violation of the NPT commitments. At the same time, the Bush Administration seems determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond Pakistan to other Muslim states. However, the facts emerging out of the probe into the A.Q. Khan episode and the international grey nuclear market indicate significant patterns of concealment and duplicity even by the NPT signatory states.
Proliferation of WMDs is a grave threat to mankind, be it their flow to ‘irresponsible states’ or to terrorists. Charged by its perception of vulnerability, the US has initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative; seeking involvement of ‘key’ states for interdiction of ‘suspect ships’ at sea. In its present form, PSI is contrary to the principle of ‘Freedom of the Seas’. Further, its operational efficacy is doubtful and it has an escalatory potential. However, bilateral arrangements as an extension of PSI may lawfully supplement global non-proliferation efforts.
