Pakistan Army

Pakistan has for long been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. While it has been a key partner of the international community in the war against terror, elements in Pakistani military establishment have been hand in glove with the very same terror outfits they are supposed to fight. This paper seeks to put a laser focus on the Janus-faced Pakistan and discuss Pakistan’s duplicitous conduct in dealing with the jihadists. A prime example of the Pakistani strategy in dealing with terror outfits is the Haqqani network which has been discussed in depth here.

• Rajeev Sharma
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The idea of Pakistan survives on the premise of enmity towards India. This premise came into existence well before Pakistan became a reality. Some in Pakistan believe that the country started incubating the moment the first Muslim stepped on the soil of the subcontinent. That belief originates from the conviction that the Islamic civilisation cannot intermingle with another civilisation because it always seeks to conquer and subjugate.

• A K Verma
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The sense of insecurity created by a regionally preponderant and militarily powerful India is the central catalytic factor that influences the dynamics of Pakistan’s regional security perception. The military-militant nexus in Pakistan, built around army’s misguided obsession with India, pursues strategic priorities in the name of protecting its national interests in Kashmir and Kabul. Sadly, both the Kashmir and Afghan policies of the military have started hurting Pakistan - internally and externally - more than India.

• Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty , Jinendra Nath Mahanty
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

A division of forces between the proposed Indian and Pakistani dominions and creation of a separate military establishment for the latter was necessitated by the partitioning of British India. An explosion of communal violence, triggered and later fuelled by the impending partition and the ethnic cleansing of the Hindus and Sikhs that preceded it in West Punjab, the mass migration of a very large number of population from and to Pakistan, the outbreak of war with India over Kashmir and the subsequent ‘Crush-India’ campaigns gave impetus to this requirement

• P. K. Upadhyay
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The aversion in India to dealing directly with Pakistan's military establishment is entirely understandable, but is also unreal given the power dynamics of Pakistani politics.

• Sushant Sareen
• April 26, 2011
• IDSA Comments

The absence of a credible interlocutor in Pakistan who can exercise effective control over the Pakistan army leaves India with little choice except to open a parallel dialogue with the military establishment in Pakistan.

• Sushant Sareen
• January 07, 2011
• IDSA Comments

India has very little leverages in shaping a peaceful, stable and friendly Pakistan but its own progress can make Pakistani society, fearful of being left behind, force a change in the state’s policy orientation.

• Rumel Dahiya
• April 19, 2010
• Issue Brief