Pakistan-China Relations

Isolated statements from China and Pakistan soliciting India’s participation in CPEC could be part of a strategic mind-game. India must consider engaging astutely in this mind-game.

• Priyanka Singh
• February 17, 2017
• Issue Brief

The Brief flags the political discontent in the three major regions that lie in the CPEC’s trajectory.

• Priyanka Singh
• November 23, 2016
• Issue Brief

Ceding PoK as part of a settlement does not comport with India’s national and strategic interests, especially in terms of dealing with the challenge posed by China-Pakistan collaboration.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• May 03, 2016
• IDSA Comments

An India-China Silk Route Corridor could have multiple advantages for both countries without at the same time compromising their security concerns.

• P. Stobdan
• October 07, 2015
• Policy Brief

India has to take a call on whether it would like to be a party to the CPEC, sit on the fence, or convey its concerns more emphatically in a bid to discourage China.

• Priyanka Singh
• May 07, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Wide-ranging agreements and proposals were signed and discussed during Li’s visit to Pakistan. The emphasis between the two countries continues to be ‘strategic’ – ‘strategic communication’ and ‘reinforcing strategic and long term planning’.

• Mandip Singh
• June 05, 2013
• Issue Brief

There is a lot of inaccuracy and assumption in reporting Chasma 3 nuclear cooperation between China-Pakistan. It is not conceivable in engineering terms as to how a 300 MWe Chasma 3 can be transformed into a 1,000 MWe project.

• G. Balachandran
• April 18, 2013
• IDSA Comments

China and Pakistan reached a formal agreement in February 2013 to construct a third nuclear reactor in Chashma. This has caused widespread nervousness while making the NSG look weak-kneed.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 05, 2013
• IDSA Comments

In keeping with the theme ‘IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap’, this article focuses on the responses to the external threat challenges that are likely to be face by IAF in 2032. The seexternal challenges have been identified to be the individual Chinese and Pakistani threats as well as a combined Sino-Pak threat. The article confines itself to developing a possible force structure only in terms of numbers of combat and support aircraft of various types for 2032.

• Vivek Kapur
• January 2014
• Journal of Defence Studies

The US seems to be devising a multi-pronged agenda to deal with the growing Chinese influence in PoK, to compel Pakistani acquiescence in the ongoing stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan and ensure its long term presence in the region.

• Priyanka Singh
• July 17, 2012
• IDSA Comments