Pakistan

The idea of Pakistan survives on the premise of enmity towards India. This premise came into existence well before Pakistan became a reality. Some in Pakistan believe that the country started incubating the moment the first Muslim stepped on the soil of the subcontinent. That belief originates from the conviction that the Islamic civilisation cannot intermingle with another civilisation because it always seeks to conquer and subjugate.

• A K Verma
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The ISI was set up in 1948, shortly after the first war with India, to strengthen sharing of intelligence between the army, navy and air force. It was headed first by Maj Gen R. Cawthorne, one of the last British officers to leave Pakistan. He continued at the helm of ISI till 1956. Thereafter, for almost three years, it remained headless as Pakistan faced constitutional turmoil leading finally to Ayub Khan’s first martial law take-over. Ayub appointed Brig Riaz Hussain as ISI chief and he continued up to 1966.

• Rana Banerjii
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The Pakistan navy (PN) is poised on the brink of a transformation. Neglected for long by Pakistan’s political masters and a dominant Pakistan army, the PN was unable to assert its salience and witnessed slow growth. But in the one decade since the September 2001 attacks and the US led ‘war on terror’, it has undergone a striking metamorphosis. As Pakistan realises the importance of having a robust maritime force and commits greater resources for its development, the tactics of the PN and its broader strategy in the northern Arabian Sea too have undergone a shift.

• Abhijit Singh
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

The sense of insecurity created by a regionally preponderant and militarily powerful India is the central catalytic factor that influences the dynamics of Pakistan’s regional security perception. The military-militant nexus in Pakistan, built around army’s misguided obsession with India, pursues strategic priorities in the name of protecting its national interests in Kashmir and Kabul. Sadly, both the Kashmir and Afghan policies of the military have started hurting Pakistan - internally and externally - more than India.

• Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty , Jinendra Nath Mahanty
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

A division of forces between the proposed Indian and Pakistani dominions and creation of a separate military establishment for the latter was necessitated by the partitioning of British India. An explosion of communal violence, triggered and later fuelled by the impending partition and the ethnic cleansing of the Hindus and Sikhs that preceded it in West Punjab, the mass migration of a very large number of population from and to Pakistan, the outbreak of war with India over Kashmir and the subsequent ‘Crush-India’ campaigns gave impetus to this requirement

• P. K. Upadhyay
• October 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

Since the infliction of unacceptable damage may not deter Pakistan from breaking the nuclear taboo, a ‘tit for tat’ strategy in case of lower order nuclear use is worth considering.

• Ali Ahmed
• October 03, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Until the US figures out an answer to the larger Pakistan problem, like India it too will have to resist the temptation of responding to Pakistani provocation with force.

• Sushant Sareen
• October 03, 2011
• IDSA Comments

It makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon is used by Pakistan, since India’s general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

• Reshmi Kazi
• August 19, 2011
• IDSA Comments

The commentary addresses the pros and cons of Pakistan’s development of Nasr and concludes that it can be neutralised by India through innovative measures.

• Ali Ahmed
• August 17, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Though Pakistan and Afghanistan still continue to be embroiled in religious and ethnic conflict, the rest of South Asia appears keen to check and go beyond such tendencies.

• Anand Kumar
• June 20, 2011
• IDSA Comments