Territorial Dispute

This Occasional Paper analyzes the Chinese territorial claim from futuristic perspective by identifying three drivers of uncertainty that has bearing on future Chinese behaviour, namely, Chinese regime stability and nationalism; the Tibet factor and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh. Based on the interactive interplay between the three drivers, the author offers four alternative scenarios with regard to China's territorial claim in 2032.

• Namrata Goswami
• 2012
• IDSA Occasional Papers

Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• May 2015
• Strategic Analysis

The response from the Indian side during the recent border incident was much more robust. However, it is important to examine the likely motives that drive the Chinese to raise the ante before the high-level visits to India.

• Rumel Dahiya
• September 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

It all appears that the Indian army this time got clear orders to hold the ground and undo what the previous UPA government did – dismantled huts, bunkers and observation posts in exchange of PLA moving back from the Indian territory.

• P. Stobdan
• September 25, 2014
• IDSA Comments

There are logical reasons for India to suitably intercede with both its neighours to facilitate an agreement on the border. A mediatory role by India may not be unwelcome by Bangladesh and Myanmar as both have friendly relations.

• Gautam Sen
• August 22, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The principal opposition of the Chinese on the McMahon line is that it is illegal and a mere product of British imperialistic designs on China. Such assessments completely disregard the fact that the McMahon line is entwined with the Tibet issue – the lynchpin of China’s territorial sovereignty and party legitimacy

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• June 05, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The reasons for abstention go far beyond the immediate issue at hand and are enveloped in deep Chinese strategic interests. The Chinese leadership is adamant that there can be no dilution of the concept of the principle of non-violation of the territorial integrity of nation states in the international system.

• R. S. Kalha
• March 21, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Soft border is neither an option nor a means to resolve the India-China border dispute. In Chinese conceptualization where borders are innately strategic frontiers, the idea of soft border is a misnomer. India should keep a distinction between the notions of soft border and boundary resolution.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• March 03, 2014
• IDSA Comments

China has created a furor by announcing the creation of an Air Defence identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkakau/Diayou islands in East China Sea. There is now little doubt that China is displaying a muscular foreign policy and most countries in Asia would be wary of a hard response because of the growing dependence of their economies on China.

• Arvind Gupta
• December 02, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The new architecture admittedly is a rehash of previously signed (1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012) de-escalatory measures. Most of the Clauses outline mechanisms for exchanging information, consultations about military activities and enhancing communications between border personnel and headquarters.

• P. Stobdan
• October 29, 2013
• IDSA Comments