As the latest wave of deadly bombings across Iraq vividly demonstrates, the war-torn country has a long way to go before it achieves an acceptable level of stability.
International focus was repositioned back to Iraq as Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid was sentenced and eventually hanged to death in Baghdad on January 25, 2010. Commonly known as… Continue reading End of Al Majid ‘Chemical’ Ali
This article employs game theory to explain the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, seeking in particular to improve the understanding of why the Iraqi dictator chose a path of action that ultimately led to his downfall. The main argument is that Saddam Hussein lacked information about his opponent's payoffs and was lured by the possibility of becoming the undisputed leading figure of the Arabic world. The analysis shows that even if the threat of an allied attack in the end proved credible, Iraq could - quite rationally - have chosen to stand firm.
The military commander most associated with executing President George Bush’s ‘troop surge’ in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus, handed over command of US forces to Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno on September 16, after completing nearly 18 months of duty at the helm. He had taken over from the then commander Gen. George Casey in early February 2007, at a time when rising American and Iraqi civilian casualties threatened to engulf the whole region with its attendant negative consequences.
After prolonged political and diplomatic negotiations between Iraq and the United States, President George Bush announced on September 9 the decision to withdraw around 8000 troops by the end of February 2009. The withdrawal would be done in a phased manner - a Marine battalion by November 2008 and an Army brigade by February 2009.
The recent American plan to transfer control of the Awakening Movement’s tribal militias to the Iraqi Army is fraught with risk for the future of Iraq. The improved security situation in Iraq has been attained by maintaining a precarious balance between several countervailing forces. Care has been taken to isolate radical Shia movements like Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi and prevent it from having any share of power in the Shia-majority government led by Nouri al-Maliki.
On June 8, Americans woke up to hear the news of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first good news out of Iraq for Americans since the capture of former President Saddam Hussain in December 2003. The news came at a time when increasing worries about US losses in Iraq had lowered the popularity ratings of President Bush to a record low of 35 per cent. Zarqawi had waged a campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings of hostages in Iraq.
The developments after 9/11 and the rise of neo-conservative thinking in United States accelerated a process that culminated in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rapid collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime marked a defining moment in international relations. ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and its aftermath created an entirely new geopolitical context not only in Iraq but also in the wider West Asia. Huge challenges have emerged as a result of the invasion of Iraq, regime change, and the political reconstruction in Iraq.
